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Abstract: Programmable Network like SDN allows administrators to program net-
work infrastructure according to service demand and custom-deﬁned policies. Net-
work policies are interpreted by the centralized controller to deﬁne actions and rules to
process the network traﬃc on devices that belong to a single domain. However, actual
networks are multi-domain where several domains are interconnected. Then, because
SDN controllers in a domain cannot deﬁne nor monitor policies in other domains,
network administrators cannot ensure that their own policies, origin policies are be-
ing enforced by the domains not directly managed by them (i.e. foreign domains).
We present AudiT, a multi-domain SDN policy veriﬁer that identiﬁes whether an
origin policy is enforced by foreign domains. AudiT comprises (1) model for network
topology, policies, and ﬂows, (2) an Audit protocol to gather information about the
actions performed by network devices to carry the ﬂows of interest, and (3) a vali-
dation engine that takes that information and detects security policy violations, and
(4) an extension to the OpenFlow protocol to enable external auditing. This paper
presents our approach and illustrates its application using an example considering
multiple SDN networks.
Keywords: Network Operating Systems, Software-Deﬁned Networking, Network
management, Policy Veriﬁcation
1 Introduction
In Software-Deﬁned Networking (SDN), network administrators use software languages to
deﬁne how network traﬃc is processed and delivered. They use these languages to implement
network policies, concrete rules about how a network must deal with speciﬁc types of traﬃc
known as ﬂows. For instance, these languages can be used to specify which users or network
machines can connect to speciﬁc servers; which network devices must be used to deliver speciﬁc
types of traﬃc, or which bandwidth can be assigned to speciﬁc ﬂows.
SDN is based on the separation of control and data planes. On one hand, the control plane
remains on a centralized server called controller that makes decisions about how the traﬃc
is processed. The controller is responsible for managing connections, addressing, and routing
protocols. Applications at the controller use speciﬁc-SDN protocols such as OpenFlow [14] to
instruct elements in the data plane how to process and deliver the network traﬃc. The data
plane consists of network devices, or datapaths, responsible for packet forwarding and switching.
Copyright© 2006-2016 by CCC Publications
Checking Multi-domain Policies in SDN 429
In the SDN architecture, a single controller manages policies and behavior of a network
domain. Only the domain controller has access to the rules used by each network device in its
own domain. Thus, neither a network device nor a controller can access information about rules
from other network domains. Although this is perfect to deal with policies in a single domain,
a network administrator cannot observe how a external network, out of its domain, handles the
traﬃc.
With the current SDN architecture, the administrator is not able to enforce nor monitor multi-
domain policies. That is because forwarding rules must be implemented on multiple domains.
For instance, today is very common that network traﬃc is delivered using a internal network
such as LANs, and external networks such as WANs and Internet. If the network administrator
wants to enforce or monitor a network policy, she can deﬁne applications in her own network
domain but cannot do it in the external domains. Unfortunately, she cannot check if external
domains enforce a network policy because she cannot determine how the traﬃc is delivered in
those external networks.
This situation can be specially critical in network security policies. For example, essen-
tial traﬃc that is delivered through external networks can be duplicated or redirected to other
network machines using a simple application in the external domain SDN controllers. Due to
network administrators cannot get access to the rules in the external networks, they are disabled
to detect these situations neither validate if a policy is achieved.
We propose a mechanism to audit network policies in multiple domains called AudIt. Our
approach overcomes these SDN limitations and allows to network administrators to validate if
the network policies are enforced by a external domain. AudiT comprises three modules: an
extension to the OpenFlow protocol to enable external auditing, the AudIt interface for network
devices that gathers information about the actions performed in external domains to carry the
ﬂows of interest, and a validation engine that runs into the internal network controller and detects
policy violations.
Other mechanisms were suggested to check network policies. For example, Hinrichs [4] de-
veloped a declarative language called Flow-based Management Language (FML) to describe
network policies and conﬁguration in a high-level and declarative approach. This FML is a
high-level declarative language, based on ﬂows, that checks the ﬁrst packet of every ﬂow against
the policy. Lately, Monsanto et. al. [16] introduce a declarative language called NetCore. It is
a high-level declarative language that describes the desired behavior of the network but does
not deepen the implementation of that behavior. With NetCore is possible to express packet
forwarding policies for SDN. Afterwards, Soulé et. al. present Merlin [21]. Merlin is also a
declarative language based on logical predicates and regular expressions with which a network
administrator can write network policies.
In contrast to previous works, we propose to express network policies as predicates but use
a SAT solver and a model ﬁnder to evaluate predicates, ﬁnd inconsistencies and detect policy
violations. AudIt uses Alloy [6] to describe the network topology, policies and network traﬃc.
Mirzaei et al. proposed used Alloy to verify network properties in [15]. In this case they model
internal states of a network and OpenFlow switches.
In summary, we introduce the foreign controller veriﬁcation problem, we deﬁne multi-domain
policies in programmable networks, a mechanism to gather information from external SDN do-
mains, and a validation engine that uses gathered information to check if a network policy is
enforced by the external domain.
Rest of this paper is organized as follow: Section 2 explains the problem of auditing own
policies at external domains; then we present a model to illustrate network topology, paths,
forwarding rules and policies in Section 3. Then, Section 4 introduces AudiT protocol and
functionality, and presents an example. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and presents
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future work.
2 Auditing policies in multi-domain networks
A Network policy is a set of conditions, constraints, and settings about how a speciﬁc type
of traﬃc must be managed by a network. It also includes which users and hosts are authorized
to create connections, and the circumstances under which they can or cannot connect. Network
policies are the accurate and unambiguous way to specify the traﬃc behavior.
Initially, Stone et al. proposed a path-based policy language (PPL) that abstracts topological
(physical) paths and ﬂows to check network properties [22]. Now, with programmable networks
as SDN, new network policy abstractions are under development, therefore the challenges in
policy checking open a rich ﬁeld of study. High-level declarative language were proposed to
represent network policies with more expressiveness. Declarative languages such as FML [4, 5]
express network policies in terms of ﬂows. For general purposes, Hinrichs developed a declara-
tive language called Flow-based Management Language (FML) to describe network policies and
conﬁguration in a high-level and declarative approach [4]. FML is based on ﬂows, and checks
the ﬁrst packet of every ﬂow against the policy. FML identiﬁes a network ﬂow by: source and
target for users, hosts, and access points, in addition to protocols and requests
A ﬂow is the speciﬁcation of a traﬃc, sometimes is called a session, that contains common
attributes such as source, destination, protocol, but also can specify more granular characteristics
as duration, valid time, users, data format and so on. Then those policies are processed using
DATALOG to ﬁnd matching ﬂows. Other languages were designed for SDN are Merlin and
NetCore. Merlin [21] is a framework to write network policies for SDN. NetCore [16] is a language
for describe forwarding rules and it is integrated with another framework called Frenetic, a project
from Cornell and Princeton universities. These languages allow network administrators to deﬁne
policies in a single-domain networks. They did not contemplate checking policy enforcement on
a third-domain.
In contrast to previous approaches, AudIt oﬀers not only the ability to write and check
network policies, it is uniﬁed with the controller and extract forwarding data and check it.
AudIt also uses the ﬂow speciﬁcation and checks if the set of ﬂows is valid for a given topology.
Moreover, AudIt reports inconsistencies in terms of ﬂows not only as instructions at the hardware
implementations.
For example, suppose that a network policy deﬁnes only computers assigned to members of
IT department can get access to database servers. We can write this policy as:
allow(src,target) | src 2 IT ^ target 2 DataBase (1)
deny(src,target) | src =2 IT ^ target 2 DataBase (2)
Expression (1) means that the network must allow ﬂows from IT to database servers. Due
to this policy must be closed, (2) denies any ﬂow from other machines to the same servers. In
SDN networks, policies are enforced by its domain controller which rules the behavior of every
forwarding device –switch– in its domain. The big question is: Can the network administrator
monitor that this policy is achieved?
2.1 Policies in Multi-domain networks
In multiple-domain networks, each domain is managed by its own controller. In our example
scenario depicted in Figure 1.a, the domain A is ruled by its controller CA, and operates the
IT department and its users. The external domain B, managed by the controller CB, operates
Checking Multi-domain Policies in SDN 431
S3
IT
S4
S6
S5S2
CA CB
S1
DB
S1 ﬂowtable
Match Action
Src = IT ^ Dst = DB h Fwd S3 i
S3 ﬂowtable
Match Action
Src = IT ^ Dst = DB h Fwd S4 i
a) Multi-domain network scenario. b) Flowtables for devices in domain A.
Figure 1: Domain Amay send a policy to be implemented in domain B, but there is not guarantee
B implements the policy correctly.
the database servers. Network administrator supervises her own controller CA, and may install
forwarding rules on devices S1, S2, and S3 to deal traﬃc generated by the IT department.
Network controller CA cannot access the rules in forwarding devices in the domain B neither
compel controller CB to install required forwarding actions into the devices S4, S5, and S6.
A multi-domain policy must be enforced by own and external domains. The controller CA
may share the policy with the controller CB, and awaits that CB implements the policy in its
devices. However, there is not certainty that delivered traﬃc in the external domain B obeys
any policy deﬁned by A. Following the example, the administrator of domain A cannot enforce
policies related to deliver traﬃc to the database servers, because the domain B is external.
2.2 Challenges in multi-domain networks
Each network controller is in charge of conﬁguring switching devices on its domain. Figure
1.b shows the required conﬁguration installed on devices in the path of domain A that process
the ﬂow until it reaches the next domain. Network conﬁguration are rules that implements
the policy. In this case, the conﬁguration conducts the ﬂow traﬃc from IT department to
database servers. This traﬃc arrives to switch S1, then is forwarded to switch S3, and ﬁnally it
is forwarded to domain B interface, switch S4. Clearly, A controller unknowns and cannot handle
implemented conﬁgurations in external domains. However, administrator want to know if their
policies are enforced in external domains. Because of database servers are located in external
network, for instance it is hosted by another company, the above policy redirects ﬂows from
the IT department to external servers but deny the ﬂows originated from sources other than IT
department. However, usually companies rely on external networks such as WANs and Internet
to deliver network ﬂows.
Since the conﬁguration of network device is protected information, it is only accessed by
its own domain controller, and administrator wants to check if the external controller applies a
policy on its domain, we have identiﬁed a main challenge: how to detect if a policy is enforced by
a external domain? and how to audit the policy enforcement without reveal risky information?
2.3 Policies in Programmable Networks
In SDN environment there are some languages to describe network policies. For example,
NetCore is a high-level declarative language that describes the desired behavior of the network
but does not deepen the implementation of that behavior. With NetCore is possible to express
packet forwarding policies for SDN networks [16]. Another work, Merlin [21] is also a declarative
language but based on logical predicates and regular expressions which can be solved using linear
programming to determine forwarding paths.
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Veriﬁcation of SDN conﬁgurations is focused on check network properties that follow a rule.
For instance VeryFlow [10] creates a network-wide invariants and checks them against rules.
FatTire [19] uses regular expressions and writes policies in this way to be able to validate.
Other works attend to ﬁnd conﬂict rules, rules that contradict earlier ones. In such a way
FortNOX [18] checks new ﬂow-rules against a ﬂow-constraint set, and authenticates the source
of rules by means of digital signatures. Another illustration is NetPlumber [9] that searches if a
candidate rule introduces network misconﬁgurations or policy violations . It executes a procedure
called Header Space Analysis (HSA) over dependency graphs to ﬁnd conﬂicts. These approaches
examine the forwarding tables from each network device and could check if they conform with
the speciﬁed policy. However, none of these approaches support the validation of policies in
external domains.
From policies to ﬂow-rule implementation Network applications – or functionality– run
on a controller and deﬁne the general behavior or policies by installing speciﬁc conﬁgurations
on each switching device. Regularly, those programs use OpenFlow (OF) [17] to communicate
controllers and forwarding devices, and install, modify, or get ﬂow-rules that specify how a device
deals with speciﬁc traﬃc. A ﬂow-rule is a pair <match,action> map on the device’s ﬂowtable.
A ﬂow-rule deﬁnes which action is performed once a packet header matches the match pattern.
OF deﬁnes a set of messages to control the internal information on each device, and rules
used to process a ﬂow. In summary, OF messages can add, modify, and query rules from device’s
ﬂowtable. Actions also include: dropping a packet (DROP), forwarding a packet to a speciﬁc
port (FWD), or report the set of installed rules (STATUS). The rule-set is closed, and the packet is
reported to the controller if its header does not match any rule.
3 Topology and Policy Models
We describe a model that involves the physical topology and paths; and network operation
deﬁnitions such as ﬂows, policies, and conﬂicts. First, we use the following speciﬁcation for
networks. We will use the relation of correspondence later on when we write the model in Alloy.
Deﬁnition 1 (Network Graph). A network graph G is a duple (N;L) such that N is the set of
nodes, and links L := (N;N;C) is the correspondence C with domain and co-domain N ! N .
Considering the links relation L, we write the function links(n) to denote fmj(n;m) 2 Lg,
the set of all the nodes m connected to a node n. In addition, for convenience, we write n! m
to express from n to m sometimes instead of (n;m) 2 L. A well-formed network G must satisfy
the following rules: 1) Network is connected, 8n 2 N j links(n) 6= ;, i.e. there are not isolated
nodes; 2) no self-loops, @n 2 N jn! n, i.e. there are not links from a node to itself; and, 3) for
all link, there is an arrival node, @n 2 N jlinks(n) \ n = ;.
It is important to note that nodes in our model does not represent a network device –
router nor switch–, a node denotes a device port. Then under this abstraction, the link relation
represents forwarding rules, not just physical links in the topology.
Deﬁnition 2 (Path). A path p is a tuple (s; t;Np; Lp). A source node s, a target node t, a
subset of nodes Np = fn1; n2; : : : ; nkg, and a subset of links that creates the sequence Lp =
f(s; n1); (n1; n2); : : : ; (nk 1; nk); (nk; t)g.
A path, can be described as a list of nodes that maintains a sequence. Path nodes Np  N ,
path links Lp  L. A well-formed path satisﬁes: 1) all implicated nodes in the links belong to
node set, 8(na; nb) 2 Lp =) fna; nbg 2 Np, 2) fs; tg 2 N , source and target nodes are in the
network, and 3) source node opens and target node ﬁnishes a path, @(n1; n2) 2 Lpjn2 = s_n1 = t.
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At this point is appropriated to describe the transitive closure. We use this concept to tackle
the reachability property when describe a path. A binary relation R is transitive if contains tuples
in the way a! b and b! c, but also contains a! c. This relation is noted as R+ and contains
R. Finally, a path has no loops, considering the relation L and the function links+(n) is the set
of all nodes that can be reached from n. Then a path has no loops if @n 2 Npjn 2 links+(n).
Also for convenience, we denote a path as a node sequence as hs; n1; n2; : : : ; ti. We include a
wildcard symbol () to denote any unspeciﬁed node or sequence of nodes. For example, the path
p = hA; ; Ci is the path that starts at node A and ends at C.
3.1 Traﬃc ﬂows
Flow is the fundamental abstraction for our model. For the reader it is similar to commu-
nication session supported by a set of paths and device conﬁgurations. Traﬃc ﬂow deﬁnes the
high-level network parameters needed to create a competent communication channel. A ﬂow
provide enough detail to describe a set of feasible sessions, and provides a form to group and
manage these sessions.
Deﬁnition 3 (Flow). A ﬂow is a sequence of traﬃc constraints f = (f1; : : : ; fn). Each term fi
is a restriction over a traﬃc characteristic, strongly related to ﬁlters on packet ﬁelds.
Due to we illustrate ﬂows as traﬃc constraints. Reader should note we indicate packet-ﬁeld
match as those constraints. The used deﬁnition allows us to construct ﬂexible and composed
communication ﬂows. A term of ﬂow involves transport-layer protocol, source / destination at
third layer, or applications. Also, we use set operators over these packet ﬁelds to deﬁne the ﬂow.
For instance, flowa = fprotocol = TCP; src_ip = 192.168.5.10; dst_ip = 192.168.7.10g
details a traﬃc ﬂow between those IP addresses and TCP as transport protocol. Note that this
ﬂow only deﬁnes the traﬃc in one way. It means, the other direction is not under this deﬁnition.
However, ﬂow deﬁnition is only associated to communication characteristics and packet ﬁelds,
but not the set of paths that supports the ﬂow.
3.2 Policies, conﬂicts and semantics
In order to deﬁne the set of paths that implements a policy and then identify policy conﬂicts
and violation we follow the guidelines of Harel and Rumpe [8] to specify a modeling language Ł
describing the syntactic domain LL, the semantic domain SL and the semantic function ML :
LL ! SL, also traditionally written JKL.
The policy is a set of rules that achieves a management procedure. Forwarding rule is the
action that a node executes to forward a packet into a computer network. Rules are described
in terms of ﬂows, by the previous deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 4 (Policy). A network policy is a tuple  = (f; P;C; ) s.t. f is the target ﬂow
composed of packet-ﬁeld values, P is the set of paths that support the ﬂow, C is a set of
conditions, over the ﬂow f or path P , and  is an action, regularly fpermit; denyg.
Essentially, a policy resolves whether allow the ﬂow f over the set P conclude on a speciﬁc
action . It is decisive and produces a conﬁguration network that allows or deny the traﬃc ﬂow.
For example, the network administrator wants to apply the policy: Ana is a user with proﬁle of
IT member, who is in the subnetwork 192.168.5.*/24 (S1), is allowed to access the database at
subnetwork 192.168.7.*/24 (S6) and port 1521, and her traﬃc must go through the router S3.
Now the manager has to detail the policy. In order to do that she solves the following steps:
1. path S1_S6 := <S1,*,S3,*,S6>,
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2. transport protocol: = TCP,
3. port number: = 1521;
4. the conditions user = Ana, and Ana 2 IT member;
5. ﬁnally the policy decision: permit
In this way, we can ﬁnd !, the set of conﬁgurations and instructions that implements the
paths and the policy . Note that IP addresses, user groups, traﬃc class and protocols should
be modeled as sets. On the other hand, ordered items such as time are modeled as sequences to
be able to compare them using  and  operators.
! = impl(p : pathj(S1_S6) ^ protocol = TCP ^ port = 1521 ^ Ana : user 2 IT member)(3)
This representation of a policy, utilizing logical conjunctions, allows us to express this policy
as a conjunctive normal form predicate (CNF), and logically solve it. Moreover, we are able to
check a formal solution using a model ﬁnder as Alloy [7], compare solutions, or ﬁnd inconsisten-
cies.
Deﬁnition 5 (Policy Semantic). A semantic of a policy J;GK is the set of paths that implements
the ﬂow over a path on G and achieves the policy.
JK = 
 is the semantic of all network policies and produces the set of all paths implemented
on the network. The complete network conﬁguration is denoted by 
. The semantic functionJ;GK of a policy contains the sets of paths, ﬂow deﬁnitions, conditions and the network G that
satisﬁes the policy . Obviously, the policy  is valid in a network G, if J;GK is not empty.
Deﬁnition 6 (Policy Conﬂict). A policy conﬂict occurs when a set of policies are not imple-
mented by any path or there are inconsistencies that prevent the generation of a path.
Essentially, if the semantic of a policy is empty, means that there is not set of conﬁguration
of paths that satisﬁes the policy. Given two valid policies 1 and 2, they are not conﬂicting in
the network G if J1 [ 2;GK is not empty. That is, two policies are not conﬂicting if there is a
set of paths, ﬂows, and restrictions in the network G that satisﬁes both policies. In contrast, we
say that two policies 1 and 2 are conﬂicting in G if jJ1 [ 2;GKj = 0.
Deﬁnition 7. (Minimal diagnosis) Given a set of policies    such that J n K 6= ;, the
minimal set  is the minimal diagnosis.
We refer to this minimal set as the littlest conﬁguration applicable without conﬂicts. Now,
we need a tool, called a veriﬁer, able to ﬁnd (calculate) the semantic function J;GK and verify if
that set is empty and the minimal diagnosis of that set. We use similar tools also for validating
paths on network infrastructure [12], and recently we show how to use of minimal diagnosis to
detect and prevent ﬁrewall-rule conﬂicts on software-deﬁned networking [13].
4 Checking multi-domain policies with AudIt
AudIt is an auditing extension for OpenSwitch protocol and OpenFlow controller that allows
domain controllers to validate security policies on a foreign domain. Our proposal creates a
language deﬁnition and transformation to audit network policies. We use Alloy to obtain a set
of tuples that satisfy the policies (exactly the semantic function). If Alloy does not ﬁnd any
element (the set is empty), the policy set is invalid or conﬂicting.
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Foreign
Alloy
SAT
Solver
Owner Domain
Figure 2: AudIt architecture
AudIt works as a validation protocol that allows a controller to gather auditing information
from external domains and validate the origin policy. It performs two phases: gathering network
information and validation process. First, the controller in the origin domain gets information
we called audit packets that is routed through the network as regular traﬃc. Then, when auditor
packet reaches devices in the external domain, these network devices report a subset of its own
ﬂowtable to the controller in the origin domain. Finally, the controller in the origin domain pro-
cess the gathered ﬂowtables to obtain all the processing rules related to the ﬂows of interest, and
executes the validation engine that checks if the external domain is accomplishing the security
policy.
4.1 AudiT Extension
OpenFlow speciﬁes a set of control messages between controller and forwarding devices.
Control messages include: modify-state to add or delete ﬂowtables in the device, collect-statistics
to read counters and device statistics, managing groups of ﬂowtables. Controller is also able to
request device status, where the device reports the ﬂowtable to the controller. AudIt uses regular
controller primitives to request information from the ﬂowtable on devices of external domain.
Information gathering Once the controller enables AudIt on each network device, and the
audit packet arrives, the device invokes OFPMP_TABLE_FEATURES and the header match to ﬁlter
a subset of the rule table that matches the header. Thereby, it extracts a set of all the related
ﬂowtable entries (RFE).
RFE = feje:src p:src [ e:target p:targetg (4)
For simplicity, our example only considers IP addresses and masks in the IT-database sce-
nario. Our RFE are deﬁned by (4). Where p is the policy and  is the match relation.
AudIt message Figure 3 shows the structure of an AudIt message. It comprises the same
ﬂow header in order to be routed through the same path; moreover, it includes origin controller
identiﬁer, controller authentication data, other AudIt settings, and the list of ﬁelds and rules to
be ﬁltered by the device.
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Flow header Origin Controller ID AudiT settings Controller Signature
List of ﬁelds List of policies
Figure 3: Structure of an AudIt packet. The list of policies are constraints over packet ﬁelds.
4.2 AudIt protocol
Figure 4 shows the proposed protocol that allows controllers to enable AudiT protocol, gather
information from foreign devices, and check policies.
1. Involved domains subscribe an audit agreement that speciﬁes the permission to create,
send and process audit packets. Then, all implicated domains update their module that
recognizes the audit request and overwrites AUDIT_ENABLE variable.
2. Origin domain A shares the traﬃc policy over IT’s traﬃc with B. Security Policy described
in section 1 - 2: DataBase is only accessed from IT department. External-domain controller
CB enforces the security policy in its network, translates the policy into rules applicable to
its infrastructure.
3. Origin controller creates an audit packet. Audit packet contains all packet ﬁelds of the
ﬂow traﬃc. This procedure request information about how the traﬃc is delivered. Thus,
foreign network devices process the audit packet as they process regular data ﬂow, or use
a interface to return the Related Flowtable Entries (RFE).
4. Foreign devices reply the audit packet with the RFE. The list of entries from its ﬂowtable.
5. At the origin, the controller of A executes the validation engine, determines if there is a
subset of rules that violates the policy, and writes a conﬂict report.
S3
IT
S4
S6
CA CB
S1
DB
Audit agreement
Trac policy 
Audit request
Forwarding rules
Conguraon set
Veri

ca

on engine
Conﬂict report
Figure 4: AudiT protocol execution. Devices from domain B report packet rules to CA, then A
veriﬁes traﬃc policy and generates an auditing report.
4.3 Multi-domain Policy Checking
At the end, origin controller owns all rules related with the traﬃc policy that comes from
the external domain, and validates the set of related ﬂowtable entries (RFE) against the policy
to identify violations. Figure 5 shows the set RFE that AC gathers from domain B. It is a list of
rules related with the traﬃc policy deﬁned in expressions 1 and 2. Then, the validation engine
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determines if this subset of rules violates the policy. This policy-rule validation engine could be
similar to [9].
S4 ﬂowtable S6 ﬂowtable
Match Action Match Action
Src = IT ^ Dst = DB h Fwd S6 i Src = IT ^ Dst = DB h Fwd DB i
Figure 5: Related ﬂowtables entries from devices in domain B.
4.4 Inference Engine based on SAT
We develop an inference engine able to check implementation procedures against network
policy. Topology is deﬁned as a set of nodes. Links is a closure relation of arity two over the
node set. Speciﬁcally for this project, we model device ports as nodes, and links by a closure
relation over nodes. Figure 6 shows how the topology is represented in terms of device ports.
A forwarding rule, the simplest instruction that redirects a packet from one port to another is
represented as part of the path. Under this perspective, the conﬁguration is part of the topology.
Forwarding rules are shown in the ﬁgure as dotted lines. These soft-links are considered as
regular topology once the model is built.
An optimization opportunity arises due to forwarding rules create soft-links that are inter-
preted as part of the topology. If the traﬃc policy is quite speciﬁc, the resultant topology is
disconnected graph, even is reduced to some paths. This abstraction of nodes as device ports,
and soft-links can reduce the complexity at evaluation time.
S1
S2
S3 S4
S5
S6
DB
IT
Figure 6: Representation of a network topology based on ports from the original deployment.
Blocks are network devices and circles are ports. Forwarding rules are depicted as dotted lines
that connect two ports.
Flow is depicted as the list of constraints over packet header, traﬃc movement sense, and
topological considerations. For example, the ﬂowtable described in Figure 1.b is the interpre-
tation of constraints, source and destination addresses, over ﬁelds of a packet header. Reader
should note that ﬂowtable also denotes the soft-link between two ports generated by the for-
warding rule. Nevertheless, this soft-links are part of the topology equally as wired links do.
In other words, the model does not discerns one from another. Communication details such as
protocols or port numbers are considered sets if these elements are part of the packet header.
Due to our work uses set theory notion of order is not considered in this model, for that reason
we cannot have policies with arithmetic conditionals. For example, the expression if the number
port is greater that 1024, then ... is invalid in our approach.
Our inference machine is implemented on Alloy [6]. It is fed with external-domain information
gathered by the audit procedure or through services that exposes forwarding information.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
We presented OpenFlow AudIt, a mechanism that checks if foreign domains are enforcing
multi-domain network policies. AudIt helps to overcome policy-checking limitations of the SDN
architecture. It comprises (1) an extension to the OpenFlow protocol to enable external auditing,
(2) an Audit protocol to gather information about rules applied to speciﬁc network ﬂows, and (3)
a validation engine that uses ﬂow information and determines if the external network is enforcing
speciﬁc traﬃc policies. Additionally, Audit can identify policy violations. It informs the network
conﬁguration, rule of ﬂow that infringes the policy and its identiﬁer. In general terms, AudIt
allows network administrators to gather information from external domains and determine if
network policies are enforced in multiple domains.
5.1 Experiments and results
We implement and test our AudIt protocol using the Floodlight controller 1. Test cases are
divided into two groups: information gathering, and violation inferencing. We run the controller
on a server and deploy a test-network using mininet 2, which operate as external domain and
implement the example topology used by Sethi in [20]. From another terminal, which operates
as owner domain, we run our AudIt interface and extract traﬃc information from the controller.
AudIt implementation creates a topology representation, a policy inventory, and a conﬁguration
repository. Thereafter, the inference engine is executed. AudIt writes, policies, conﬁgurations
and topology as Alloy instructions and executes the satisﬁability solver.
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Figure 7: Solutions from Alloy implementation. The same implementation is evaluated using
two solvers: minisat and minisatprover with minimal unsatisﬁable core.
Figure 7 shows two evaluations over the same topology and set of policies. We implement
the same FatTree topology also described in [20] to compare our approach. AudIt takes less
than a second using the minisat solver, which only ﬁnds if an instance accomplishes the set of
policies. On the other hand, if the network administrator wants to determine the set of policies
violated by the external domain, she executes AudIt with the minisatprover option and could
take up to 1:5s. These measures are lower than the values reported on [20], for the same Fat Tree
topology composed of 20 switches, 16 hosts, and 48 links. We test forwarding and reachability on
a Intel i5 at 3.0 GHz, with 3.74 GB RAM. With the intension to show how state explosion and
variable aﬀect the performance we test AudIt for 930K, 1.5M, 2.2M and 2.8M of states, which
are represented on primary variables shown in Figure 7.
However, AudIt does not have complete information about the network as opposed to Net-
Plumber [9]. Moreover, Audit requires the deployment of our OpenFlow extensions into the
1http://www.projectfloodlight.org/floodlight/
2mininet.org
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network devices in those external domains. Commercial products (i.e. switches from companies
such as IBM or HP) do not support the deployment of new extensions without a ﬁrmware update.
We expect that future experimental implementation shows the beneﬁts of Audit and can be a
foundation to introduce multi-domain policy validation into the standard.
Letting external domains gather information about network ﬂow processing may represent
a potential security risk for external controllers. In addition, controllers in external domains
may include programs that hide information or mimic policy enforcement. Future work focuses
on evaluating security risks on our experimental implementation in order to determine which
additional mechanisms are required to ensure safe auditing of multi-domain policies.
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